Applicants, employees, unpaid interns, and individuals in apprenticeship programs or any other program to provide unpaid work experience are protected from religious discrimination and must be reasonably accommodated.2 For more information, see “Reasonable Accommodation and Religion” on this page.

The law protects individuals with "sincerely held" religious beliefs and practices, not just those who are a part of an organized religion or religious sect.3

The definition of religion necessarily includes the absence of religion. You cannot discriminate against applicants or employees because they are atheist or agnostic. You cannot require an employee to participate in a particular religious observance or practice.4

• Effective October 1, 2025, FEHA regulations state that it is unlawful for an employer or other covered entity to use an automated-decision system or selection criteria, including a qualification standard, employment test, or proxy (a characteristic or category closely correlated with a FEHA-protected characteristic) that discriminates against an applicant or employee or a class of applicants or employees on the basis of religion.5 In other words, the religious discrimination prohibitions discussed in this section still apply when the employer uses an automated decision system in their practices. This may include, for example, using automated decision systems, including artificial intelligence, in assessing applicants and employees, screening resumes, and other employment practices.

For more information, see Automated Decision Systems and Artificial Intelligence in FEHA - California's Fair Employment and Housing Act.

Exemptions for Religious Corporations and Associations

The law provides religious organizations with certain exceptions to anti-discrimination laws.

Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act permits religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion alone and only for jobs in which the practice of and belief in the religion of the organization is a legitimate, job- related requirement. The work must be connected with carrying out the organization's religious activities.6 The rationale behind this exception is that it allows religious organizations to employ individuals who share their religion. Religious organizations cannot discriminate against members of other protected classes.

Nonprofit religious corporations and religious associations are generally exempt from California’s employment discrimination laws.7 For example, these employers can require that employees in jobs that involve religious duties must be adherents of the religion.8

Religious associations are also generally exempt from federal employment discrimination laws under what is commonly referred to as the ministerial exception, a legal doctrine established through the courts.9 The ministerial exception stems from the Constitution’s First Amendment, generally prohibiting government interference in the practice of religion. This includes a religious organization's right to select their own leaders. The exception effectively bars employees who perform ministerial duties from suing the religious organization under otherwise generally applicable employment laws. However, the exception does not apply to all employees of a religious organization — only to “ministers.”

In Hosanna-Tabor, the plaintiff claimed she was fired in violation of the ADA. Hosanna-Tabor invoked the ministerial exception to bar the claim. In order to determine whether the employee was a minister under the exception, the Supreme Court considered “all the circumstances” of her employment, breaking its analysis into four major considerations:

• Whether the employer held the employee out as a minister;
• Whether the employee's title reflected ministerial substance and training;
• Whether the employee held herself out as a minister; and
• Whether the employee's job duties included “important religious functions.”

After Hosanna-Tabor, courts have generally used these four factors to analyze the exception. Based on consideration of the four factors, the Court concluded the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor fell under the exception:

• She was a teacher at a Lutheran school with the title of “Minister of Religion, Commissioned;”
• She had a significant degree of religious training supporting her title, including eight college level courses, special endorsements and recommendations, and passing a final oral examination. Altogether, her training took six years to complete;
• She held herself out as a minister, accepting her formal call to religious service, even claiming a special housing allowance on her taxes; and
• Her job duties included important religious functions in carrying out the church's message and mission through her teaching.

Applying the exception, the plaintiff's wrongful termination claim was barred.

In Biel v. St. James School, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the ministerial exception narrowly, declining to apply it to a teacher at a Catholic School who lacked some of the formal credentials and expertise of the teacher in Hosanna-Tabor.10

However, a U.S. Supreme Court decision rejected the Ninth Circuit’s narrow application of religious exception in Biel and a similar case it consolidated on review. Though both teachers lacked the title of “minister” and formal credentials of the teacher in Hosanna-Tabor, the court found that the teachers were covered by the exception. The Court explained how the four Hosanna-Tabor factors are not “inflexible requirements” and may have less significance in other cases, and the court rejected arguments to create a rigid formula for this religious exception because doing so may require courts to wade too far into questions of religion. Instead, the court focused on what the employee does — rather than titles, credentials or other rigid criteria.11

The court’s decision broadened the First Amendment religious exception to employment discrimination claims. However, religious employers shouldn’t assume that all of their employees are covered by the exception. The court’s rationale rested heavily on the importance of teaching and education in religious traditions, which the court called a vital religious duty. It’s less clear how this opinion will be applied to other employees outside of that context.

Additionally, even though the court focused on the employee’s duties in its analysis, it’s still likely helpful to have job descriptions that clearly define any formal education and training requirements that qualify the individual for a position that would fall under the ministerial exception.

• Recently, the Ninth Circuit found that an employee who was a mashgiach — which ensures food meets Jewish dietary law standards to be labeled “kosher” — served an essential function in his organization’s mission to support the Orthodox Jewish Community, and along with other reasons, held that the employee was a minister.12

• Most recently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a religious employer’s customer service representatives (CSR) perform key religious functions and fall, therefore, under the ministerial exemption.13 These CSRs were the sole employees interfacing with donors and soliciting donations, which the employer viewed as a form of ministry or religious practice. CSRs also routinely pray with donors about their needs and the needs of the children they sponsor and are responsible for teaching curious donors about their employer’s Christian faith and giving them an opportunity to join in their mission. When examined in context, the court said, these CSRs qualify for the ministerial exception because they perform vital religious functions that lie at the core of the employer’s particular religious mission.

In 2023, a California Court of Appeal found that although a religious school employee may engage in some religious teachings while performing their job duties, it may not be enough to exempt the religious school from employment discrimination laws. The employee argued that, unlike the teachers in Hosanna Tabor or Morrissey-Berru, her job duties, which were split between office/administrative duties and teaching studio art and art history, didn’t fall within the religious instruction that, in those cases, triggered the ministerial exception — her office role duties were purely secular, and she didn’t engage in religious teachings to her art students. The court determined there was enough factual ambiguity over her role that it could not dismiss her claims as barred under the ministerial exception.14

Religious Employers in Health Care

Special rules apply to religious employers in the health care industry.15 Hospitals that are owned or operated by religious corporations that provide services to people who do not adhere to that religion and hospitals that are religiously affiliated, nonprofit public benefit corporations generally cannot engage in discrimination or harassment. However, those employers can take a person’s religion into account when hiring and promoting executives, pastors, physicians, nurses and other health care providers.

Reasonable Accommodation and Religion

You must accommodate an applicant’s, employee’s or unpaid intern’s religious creed unless you can demonstrate that the accommodation is unreasonable because it would impose an undue hardship.16 All aspects of religious belief, observance and practice must be accommodated.

What is a reasonable accommodation in the context of sincerely held religious beliefs? California regulations specify that a reasonable accommodation in this context is one that eliminates the conflict between the religious practice and the job requirement and can include job restructuring, job reassignment, modification of work practices or allowing time off to avoid a conflict with an employee's religious observances.17

• However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that employees may not bring religious discrimination claims based only on broad, generic religious principles underpinned by secular reasoning. The court ruled in favor of an employer who declined to provide the requested religious accommodation because the basis for the request was secular and not religious, despite the employee’s assertions.18

Similar to reasonable accommodations for disabilities, when receiving an accommodation request for an individual's sincerely held religious belief, employers should engage in the interactive process and explore any available reasonable alternative means of accommodating the religious belief or observance.

• Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified that employees have a very low threshold to meet under the FEHA’s notice requirement when providing notice that a work requirement conflicts with their sincerely held religious belief. The court reiterated that:

• The notice requirement is basic; and
• The employer only needs enough information to understand a religious conflict exists, which then triggers the employer’s responsibility to engage in a good-faith interactive process to determine if the employer can reasonably accommodate the belief.19

Reasonable accommodations can take many forms, depending on the circumstances. California regulations state that reasonable accommodation may include, but is not limited to, the following:

• Interview and examination times: Scheduled times for interviews, examinations and other functions that are related to employment opportunities must reasonably accommodate religious practices.
• Dress standards: Dress standards or requirements for personal appearance must take into account religious practices.
• Union dues: An employer or union cannot require membership from any employee or applicant whose religious creed prohibits this membership. An applicant's or employee's religious creed must be reasonably accommodated regarding union dues.

California law also specifically includes observances of a sabbath or other religious holy day, and reasonable time off needed for associated travel.20

It is against the law to refuse to hire someone or to terminate an employee because you want to avoid the need to accommodate a religious practice.21

An accommodation is not required if it violates any other law prohibiting discrimination or protecting civil rights.

Under FEHA, the mere act of requesting a reasonable accommodation of a religious belief is a protected activity. An employer cannot discriminate or retaliate against a person for requesting an accommodation — regardless of whether the request was granted.22

Reasonable accommodation is one that eliminates the conflict between the religious practice and the job requirement and can include job restructuring, job reassignment, modification of work practices or allowing time off to avoid a conflict with an employee’s religious observances.23

Under California law, an undue hardship is defined as an “action requiring significant difficulty or expense” when considered in light of several factors. When determining if a reasonable accommodation would impose an undue hardship on your business operations, consider the following issues:

• Your overall size with respect to the number of employees, number and type of facilities and size of budget.
• The type of operation, including the workforce or membership composition and structure.
• The nature and cost of the accommodation involved.
• Reasonable notice to the employer of the need for accommodation.
• Any available reasonable alternative means of accommodation.24

A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision clarified that under Title VII, undue hardship means the religious accommodation would result in “substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business.”25

Like California law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for the religious needs of employees unless doing so would create an “undue hardship.” In the past, however, the federal test for establishing undue hardship was relatively easy, unlike California law. The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Groff v. Dejoy, the first decision to address religious accommodations under federal law in decades, changed this and revised the test.

Under federal precedent prior to Groff, requiring an employer to “bear more than a de minimis cost” — something more than a minimal expense to the business — would be an undue hardship. Federal courts recognized that this was not a difficult standard to meet. The Supreme Court, however, took the position that Title VII requires a higher standard, and the “more than a de minimis cost” language from the older case had been taken out of context.

After in-depth analysis of Title VII and previous precedents, the Supreme Court clarified that Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation “would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business.” Courts must apply the test in a manner that considers all relevant factors in the case — including the particular accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the employer’s nature, size and operating cost.

The Supreme Court further stated that a prospective accommodation’s impact on coworkers is relevant only to the extent that impact goes on to affect the conduct of the business. In other words, employers must make a logical connection between the impact an accommodation has on its employees (e.g., covering someone’s shifts, working overtime) and how that affects the conduct of the business (e.g., productivity, morale, workplace safety, etc.). The Court also clarified that hardship in the form of hostility toward a religious belief, practice or accommodation is not “undue,” meaning employers can’t deny an accommodation for that reason.

With the Supreme Court using language similar to California law (“substantial increased costs” v. “significant difficulty or expense”), the federal and state law religious accommodation undue hardship standards are much closer now, though it’s important to remember that these are two different laws and it’s unclear the extent to which these standards might match up or differ depending on the circumstances of each case.

Accommodation of Religious Dress and Grooming Practices

California’s religious discrimination protections and reasonable accommodation requirements cover religious dress practices and religious grooming practices, issues that come up regularly in the workplace. Employers must provide reasonable accommodation in these instances unless doing so would impose an undue hardship.

Government Code sections 12926 and 12940 provide the following definitions:

• “Religious dress practice” is construed broadly to include the wearing or carrying of religious clothing, head or face coverings, jewelry, artifacts and any other item that is part of the observance by an individual of his or her religious creed.
• “Religious grooming practice” is construed broadly and includes all forms of head, facial and body hair that are part of the observance by an individual of his or her religious creed.

Employers can’t segregate employees wearing religious dress, such as head coverings, from jobs that involve public contact. Such employer actions, based on perceived biases or customer preferences, are unlawful.

The law specifically states that, unless requested by an employee, an accommodation of a religious dress or grooming practice that would require segregation of the individual from other employees, customers or the public is “not reasonable.”26

Under federal law, covered employers must also make exceptions to their usual rules or preferences to permit applicants and employees to follow religiously-mandated dress and grooming practices unless doing so would pose an undue hardship to the operation of an employer's business.

Reasonable accommodation for an employee’s religious requirements might include adjusting a required uniform to meet the employee’s religious dress needs, if an accommodation does not create an undue hardship on your operations.27

In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court found that an employer engaged in religious discrimination under federal law when it refused to accommodate a Muslim applicant because she wore a hijab, an Islamic religious headscarf.28

At issue in the case was whether an employer violates Title VII for failing to accommodate an employee's religious practices when the employer had no knowledge of the employee's accommodation request.

The Court ruled that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "[a]n employer may not make an applicant's religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions," regardless of whether the employer had actual knowledge of the applicant's need for an accommodation. To prevail, an applicant needs to show only that the need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer's decision, not that the employer had knowledge of their need.

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) published a question-and-answer guide entitled "Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace: Rights and Responsibilities." The publication discusses applicable federal law and provides practical advice for employers and employees. It is available on the EEOC website.

• Employers will want to work with applicants and employees to determine reasonable accommodations for religious beliefs and engage in the interactive process. A case-by-case determination is required.

Accommodation of Scheduling

Changing shift schedules, examination times, scheduled times for interviews, and the like may be reasonable accommodations for applicants and employees depending on the circumstances.

In Opuku-Boateng v. State of California, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a change in shift scheduling would be a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s religious beliefs. It found that making minor changes in an employee’s shift scheduling does not create preferential treatment or impose a severe burden on other employees.29

Courts recognize that accommodation for an employee’s religious beliefs may not be required when the accommodation would require the employer to assign jobs in violation of a seniority provision in a collective bargaining agreement.30 Religious accommodation may not be required if it could result in adverse impact on other employees in the absence of a contractual seniority system.31

Under state law you must demonstrate that you have explored any available reasonable alternative means of accommodating the religious belief or observance including the possibilities of excusing the person from those duties that conflict with his or her religious beliefs or permitting those duties to be performed at another time or by another person, but that you are unable to make the accommodation without undue hardship.32 Based on company policies and a collective bargaining agreement, an inability to adjust an employee’s schedule for numerous absences for religious observance is not unreasonable. You need not accommodate every employee request for accommodation.33

Other Accommodation Issues

In Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a company did not unlawfully discharge a self-described “devout Christian” employee who posted biblical scriptures in his cubicle that were critical of homosexuals. The scriptures were visible to passersby. His supervisor removed the verses, finding them to be offensive and contrary to the company’s anti-harassment policy.

The employee said that he posted the scriptural passages to hurt gay and lesbian employees, with the hope the messages would cause them to repent and be saved. He argued that the workplace diversity campaign discriminated against fundamentalist Christian employees. He was terminated for refusing to stop the postings.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found neither religious discrimination nor any legal obligation to accommodate the employee’s beliefs. Requiring the company to accommodate the employee’s religious beliefs would have caused an undue hardship on the organization’s operations.34

In Bolden-Hardge v. Office of the California State Controller, et al, a California public sector employee asked a government agency to amend the California Constitution-required loyalty oath to accommodate her Jehovah’s Witness religious beliefs. When it refused, she filed a lawsuit, claiming that the loyalty oath requires her to swear primary allegiance to a human government over God and forces her to choose between her beliefs and her job. The Ninth Circuit court agreed. Conflict between job requirements and religious beliefs may take many forms and trigger FEHA and Title VII protections. Failing to engage in a good faith, interactive process to explore any and all possible reasonable accommodations exposes employers to liability as much as firing a person due to their religious beliefs.35

1. Gov't. Code sec. 12926(q) 167. 2 CCR sec. 11059