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by Michelle Galbraith, J.D.; Employment Law Adviser, CalChamber
State and federal laws protect workers from discrimination on the basis of certain characteristics, such as sex, race, ethnicity, religion and disability. However, when the opposing interests of two protected classes intersect, employers can face a complicated issue.
A recent lawsuit in Virginia highlights exactly that conflict. In the case, Zinski v. Liberty Univ., 6:24-cv-00041 (W.D. Va. Feb. 21, 2025), a religious university terminated an employee for being transgender — a clear case of sex discrimination. However, the employer claimed that its doctrine of faith states that humans are biologically male or female only, so the termination was protected under religious freedom, and the complaint should be dismissed.
In a lengthy ruling, the trial judge denied the motion to dismiss the case, allowing the plaintiff to proceed to trial. He noted the difficulty in balancing the competing interests of eradicating employment discrimination while also permitting religious institutions the ability to cultivate a workforce that conforms to their principles. But he noted that permitting religious liberty to override all forms of employment discrimination could result in a complete dismantling of protections for disadvantaged workers and allowed the plaintiff to proceed on her claims.
Although the opinion is not binding on California courts, employers should still be aware of the underlying issues and develop policies that will avoid favoring the interests of one protected class above another.
Liberty University is a private Evangelical Christian university in Lynchburg, Virginia. Its website affirms that it is committed to a biblical worldview, with the vision of developing “Christ-centered men and women.” To further these goals, it requires its employees to sign its Doctrinal Position document that states, among other things, that “[h]uman beings were directly created, not evolved, in the very image of God, as either biologically male or female from the womb.”
Ellenor Zinski worked as an information services apprentice for Liberty University from February 2023 until her termination in July of that year. When she began working with Liberty, she went by the name Jonathan; she had been assigned that name and the sex of male at birth.
Zinski’s job duties included assisting students and staff with computer issues, troubleshooting issues with classroom equipment and managing technology-related administrative tasks. She regularly received positive performance reviews, and as late as June 2023, her performance assessment was “above average,” stating that she was “on the path to success.”
In July 2023, Zinski informed her human resources department that she was a transgender woman and had begun hormone therapy consistent with her gender identity. She also stated that she intended to legally change her name to Ellenor.
Liberty management informed Zinski that her decision to transition from male to female violated the university’s religious beliefs. They provided her with a letter terminating her employment, referencing the Doctrinal Position, and stating that the reason for termination was her transition from male to female.
Zinski sued Liberty for sex discrimination. The university responded that because it is a religious institution, it cannot be forced to employ any individuals who manifest opposition to its religious positions.
Religious institutions are generally exempt from claims of religious discrimination. This exemption is designed to permit religious employers to create a workplace faithful to their doctrine; it also means they typically can terminate individuals whose conduct or beliefs are inconsistent with that doctrine. For example, a federal court of appeal upheld the termination of a Catholic school teacher who entered into a second marriage without appropriate validation from the church in violation of Catholic law.
Citing this exemption, Liberty argued that its termination of Zinski was lawful: it claimed that the termination was not because of sex, but because of religion. Essentially, Liberty argued because being transgender was contrary to the university’s doctrine, Zinski could not be practicing its faith principles.
The district court disagreed, holding that this exemption does not permit a religious institution to engage in unlawful discrimination under the auspices of religion. The court noted that allowing unlimited protections for the termination decisions of religious institutions could completely erase protections against sex, race, age and other protected class discrimination. For these reasons, it stated that discrimination on the basis of transgender sex is unlawful, even if religiously motivated.
The court then turned to Liberty’s other defense, that termination was appropriate under the ministerial exception. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that this exception is necessary to protect a religious institution’s First Amendment ability to “select and control who will minister to the faithful,” and it established a four-pronged test to determine if the ministerial exception applies to a particular plaintiff. That test includes:
In Zinski, the court held that the exception could not apply because she was not a minister. As an information services apprentice, a job title and department that the court said were entirely secular, she never engaged in any teaching — religious or otherwise— and did not hold herself out as a minister. Liberty, therefore, could not rely on the ministerial exception to justify her termination.
The court denied Liberty’s motion to dismiss; the case will now proceed to trial.
Although Zinski involved the balance between sex discrimination against an individual and the religious freedoms of a religious employer, secular employers could also have to weigh similar competing interests. For example, California law requires employers to allow employees to use the restroom, locker room or changing room that corresponds with their gender identity — not necessarily the sex assigned at their birth. Employers with transgender workers may receive complaints from individuals who claim that their religious beliefs prohibit them from sharing facilities with those coworkers.
In cases such as these, employers need to respect the identities and beliefs of all employees and may need to consider working with the complaining employee to develop a reasonable accommodation. However, as demonstrated by Zinski, employers should avoid any resolution that favors the interests of one protected class over another.
Additionally, employers should remember that the law defines “religion” very broadly. Individuals with “sincerely held” beliefs are protected, not just those who are part of an organized religion and, therefore, managers cannot deny religious accommodation claims simply because the doctrine cited is obscure.
Finally, the act of requesting a religious accommodation is a protected activity, so employers may not retaliate against anyone requesting accommodation — even if the request, if granted, would violate California law. Employers should respond promptly to any accommodation request and engage with the worker to reach a resolution that balances the religious practice and the company’s needs.